The Role of NSF's Support of Engineering in Enabling Technological Innovation: IV. THE INTERNET
Center for Science, Technology, and Economic Development (CSTED) > Selected Reports
The Role of NSF's Support of Engineering in Enabling Technological Innovation
IV. THE INTERNET
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGERIAL INNOVATION
In May 1995, the Internet was owned by no one and
managed by a wide variety of commercial and nonprofit organizations
on a decentralized basis. NSFNET operated at 45 Mbps, which was
raised to 155 Mbps after NSFNET was decommissioned and MCI took
over operation of the research backbone. Nearly 60,000 networks
were connected to the backbone. Just 10 years earlier, the government-owned
and managed NSFNET connected five university-based supercomputer
centers via a 56-Kbps backbone. NSFNET was connected to the Defense
Departments ARPANET, which linked only ARPA-supported researchers.
The only other wide-area networks in existence, all government
owned, supported only handfuls of specialized contractors and
researchers. Four key, innovative decisions, all made by NSF
(with considerable advice and cooperation from others), largely
account for these dramatic changes:
The decision to make NSFNET an open network rather
than one that served supercomputer researchers exclusively.
The decision to make NSFNET a three-tiered, distributed network
consisting of backbone, regional or mid-level networks, and local,
initially campus-based, networks.
The decision to make the Internet self-supporting.
The series of decisions concerning how #3 might be accomplished.
In 1985, NSF sought to reach a larger proportion of the research
community than was included in the original base of CSNET and
the original NSFNET. This involved two steps: the signing of
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ARPA to link ARPANET
to the NSF supercomputer centers, and the NSF Connections program,
launched in 1986, to provide support to other universities seeking
access to the supercomputers. One provision of the Connections
program was that all the NSF-funded computer centers and networks
had to use the TCP/IP protocol, which allowed NSF researchers
on the NSFNET to communicate with other networks using different
hardware and operating systems (Mandelbaum and Mandelbaum, 1993:
61). Both steps were taken by Dennis Jennings, the first NSFNET
program director. According to Steve Wolff, achieving the MOU
was a major innovative milestone (SRI interview with
Steve Wolff, April 23, 1996).
The decision to require TCP/IP was not an obvious one. First,
Jennings chose a nonproprietary rather than a proprietary protocol
such as DECNET. Second, among nonproprietary protocols, his choice
of TCP/IP allowed the subsequent expansion of linkages to NSFNET.
The decision by Dennis Jennings, NSFs program director for
networking, to choose TCP/IP over X.25 as the mandated protocol
for the emerging NSFNET was a far-reaching decision that was to
have major consequences. It led almost directly to the establishment
of the system of specialized, private academic networks we have
today, rather than to reliance by the academic and research community
on the public, commercial networks that are the mainstays of the
business world. ... The choice of a proprietary protocol such
as DECNET would have led to a far different networking universe
than the one we have today. (Mandelbaum and Mandelbaum, 1993:
62)
These specific decisions were made within a larger context at
NSF, an environment favoring widespread, open access to computer-based
communication. That environment was not necessarily shared by
other government agencies, as Steve Wolff pointed out: NASA
and DOE wanted to limit the network to a defined constituency,
such as researchers at the federal labs and grant recipients,
and run it for them. But I thought the money wouldn't be there
forever, and even if it was, we should do more things with it,
build bigger networks (SRI interview with Steve Wolff, April
23, 1996). Hans-Werner Braun, co-PI of the Merit proposal, said
of Wolff, In fact, shortly after Steve Wolff started at
NSF he made comments to me, and I assume to others as well, saying
I do not want to see this network only as a supercomputing
center network (Merit, 1995: 17).
In response to the Connections solicitation, NSF received innovative
responses from what would become two of the major regional networks:
SURANET and NYSERNET. They proposed a regional, distributed network
design rather than one with all universities independently connected
to the regional supercomputing center (a star design).
SURANET was a consortium of 37 southern universities. NYSERNET,
based at Cornell, would be completely responsible for funding,
industry relations, network equipment, and monitoring (Mandelbaum
and Mandelbaum, 1993: 62).
The NYSERNET and SURANET examples caused a major paradigm shift
at NSF. Instead of funding institutional connections to supercomputer
centers, the NSF shifted to funding connections of cohesive
regional networks. ... NSFNET is not a network. It is an internetwork-i.e.,
a network of networks, which are organizationally and technically
autonomous but which interoperate with one another. (Mandelbaum
and Mandelbaum, 1993: 65)
Within a year after NSFNETs beginning, the flow of traffic
was so great that it was obvious an upgrade was necessary. Steve
Wolff, by then the second program manager for NSFNET, headed the
project. The solicitation was drafted by Wolff and Dan Van Bellegham.
It called for upgrading the NSFNET backbone to 1.5 Mbps; it encouraged
participation by private companies; it incorporated the three-tier
structure; it required the use of TCP/IP; it provided for a phasing
out of NSF support over time; and it incorporated NSFs Acceptable
Use Policy[71] (AUP), which spelled out conditions for commercial
use of the network (Merit, 1995: 18-19). According to Vinton
Cerf,
Among the most critical decisions that NSF made was to support
the creation of "regional" or "intermediate-level"
networks that would aggregate demand from the nations universities
and feed it to the NSFNET backbone. ... The regional networks
quickly became the primary means by which universities and other
research institutions linked to the NSFNET backbone. NSF wisely
advised these networks that their seed funding would have limited
duration and they would have to become self-sustaining. (Cerf,
1995)
Robert Kahn observed that the growth of the regional networks
was critical to the success of the Internet, and that this growth
was partially stimulated by the phaseout of ARPANET in 1988.
He noted further that 1988 marked the introduction of MCI Mail
into the Internet and the commercialization of the regional networks.
The move toward the commercialization and further growth of the
Internet was triggered by the Federal Networking Council (FNC)[72]
decision to allow a shift toward "for profit." The
NSF played the dominant role in this decision. (SRI interview
with Robert Kahn, April 22, 1996).
Steve Wolff, working within a supportive environment provided
by NSF Director Erich Bloch, was a key figure in these decisions.
Wolff saw that commercial interests eventually had to become
a part of the network and provide financial support for it:
It had to come, because it was obvious that if it didnt
come in a coordinated way, it would come in a haphazard way, and
the academic community would remain aloof, on the margin. Thats
the wrong model: multiple networks again, rather than a single
Internet. There had to be commercial activity to help support
networking, to help build volume on the network. That would get
the cost down for everybody, including the academic community-which
is what the NSF was supposed to be doing. (Merit, 1995: 33)
Vinton Cerf sees Wolff as the absolute key to the
policy decision to allow for-profit information providers on the
network (SRI interview with Cerf).
Wolff and others pointed to Blochs role: The unsung
hero of the project is Erich Bloch; his support never wavered
(SRI interview with Wolff). Erich Bloch joined the NSF
and fostered an environment for networking (SRI interview
with Kahn). Erich Bloch knew how to get the money and play the
politics; Steve Wolff knew what to do with it (SRI interview
with Kahn).
NSF's decision to permit commercial access to NSFNET (under conditions
specified by the Acceptable Use Policy) and to provide support
for the backbone under conditions that were intended to lead to
privatization of the Internet generated controversy both within
and outside the Foundation. During congressional hearings on
NSFNET in 1992, a number of concerns were identified:
Modification of the cooperative agreement with Merit, Inc.,
for expansion of the backbone to T3 (45 Mbps) without rebidding
the contract.
Privatization of the backbone.
Commercial use of the backbone.
Rick Boucher, Chair of the Subcommittee on Science of the House
Science, Space, and Technology Committee requested the NSF Inspector
General to investigate these and other issues that arose after
the initial 1987 solicitation for management and operation of
the backbone. The Inspector General's 1993 report, "Review
of NSFNET" (NSF, 1993),concluded that NSF's actions were
legal and within the Foundation's discretionary authority. Criticism
focused on the lack of documentation of NSF's decision to allow
commercial access and on the lack of review of the decision by
peers, supervisory staff, or the National Science Board.[73]
The 1988 solicitation, won by Merit, Inc., paved the way for the
next major upgrade, which came in 1993, when NSF offered a solicitation
calling for a new, high-speed research backbone (vBNS, or very
high speed backbone network service), Network Access Points (NAPs),
a Routing Arbiter, and Regional Network Provider awards. The
backbone would operate at 155 Mbps; NAPs would act as interconnection
points for commercial Internet service providers; the Regional
Arbiter would manage the growing routing tables and databases
for the providers connecting at the NAPs. Regional and midlevel
networks would continue to receive NSF funding, phased out over
a 4-year period. The high-speed research backbone, vBNS, was
given to MCI; NAP manager awards were given to Sprint, MFS Datanet,
and Bellcore. Thus the basis for the current Internet was laid,
and was realized in April 1995.[74]
CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding section, we focus on four aspects of the evolution
of the Internet: (1) government, industry, and university roles
and relationships; (2) the relationships between fundamental research
and technology development; (3) the role of property rights; and
(4) the role of NSF. In the case of NSF's role, we distinguish
between innovative leadership and financial support.
Support can take several forms, including support for research,
for education, and for infrastructure (e.g., travel, coordination,
instrumentation, and facilities).
Government, Industry, University Roles and Relationships
Vinton Cerf's brief characterization of the shift in support and
control of the Internet captures the dramatic change that occurred
over the innovation's 20-year history: "A fully commercial
system of backbones has been erected, where a government sponsored
system once existed. Indeed, the key networks that made the Internet
possible ... are now gone-but the Internet thrives!" The
first "Internet" was the interconnection of dissimilar
networks consisting of ARPANET, packet radio, and packet satellite
under Kahn's sponsorship in 1977. This and the subsequent connection
of ARPANET and CSNET were entirely government owned and supported,
with university researchers and contractors such as BBN supplying
hardware, software, and services. Within a decade, as a result
of key decisions made primarily by NSF, a three-tiered system
of internetworks existed, managed and supported by a mix of universities,
nonprofit organizations, and government agencies, with portions
operated by common carriers and commercial service providers.
At present, the mix of operators remains, but the basic Internet
backbone is owned and operated by commercial firms.
A significant aspect of this institutional evolution can be attributed
to NSF's insistence that, whatever form the research-based network
it originally envisioned might take, it should be accessible to
supercomputer users and PC users alike; it should permit seamless
interconnections among all major existing networks; and, to ensure
its survival, it should eventually become self-supporting. These
features meant choosing TCP/IP over other protocols, working out
ways for commercial activities to be included on the Internet,
and building bridges between NSF and other federal agencies so
that all major government networks were included. None of these
decisions were easy or obvious, and the ones involving commercial
use of the Internet proved especially challenging.
In the mid- to late 1960s, before ARPANET's implementation, the
issue of packet switching as a technology for data networks was
debated during the Spring and Fall Joint Computer Conferences.
The communications industry was skeptical. SRI's Don Nielson
observed that industry initially "dropped the ball"
on the Internet. None of the common carriers foresaw a market
for digital communication; they regarded themselves as suppliers
of telephone services only. Indeed, several of our respondents
commented on AT&T's extreme skepticism-even opposition-when
the idea of packet-switched, rather than circuit-switched, networks
first appeared. Computer manufacturers such as IBM and Digital
saw the potential for profit but insisted on using their own (proprietary)
protocols. Since there was no industry leader, a dominant industry
protocol did not emerge. In this sense, government-first DOD/ARPA
and then NSF-played the role of key innovator in the evolution
of the Internet. Agency leaders and program managers took technical
and political risks, and the risk-taking seems to have paid off.
All three institutions-government, industry, and universities-played
significant but different roles in the development of the Internet.
To some extent, this extensive involvement of all three types
of institutions can be attributed to an "invisible college"
that transcended institutional sectors, a feature of many areas
of U.S. science and engineering. The focus of technical and organizational
innovation shifted from government to industry over a 30-year
period, with universities playing a constant supportive role over
the entire time. One way to capture both the nature of these
differing roles and their relationships is to trace the career
paths of some of the major contributors to the Internet: Cerf,
Kahn, Jennings, Wolff, Baran, Roberts, Mills, Andreessen, Bloch.
Cerf began as an academic in computer science at Stanford, then
joined ARPA as a program manager, was a Vice President of CNRI
with Robert Kahn during 1986-94, and is now a Senior Vice President
of MCI. Kahn also began as an academic, in electrical engineering
at MIT, then took leave to go to BBN until he joined ARPA. Jennings
came to NSF from University College at Dublin, and Wolff from
the Army Research Office after serving on the faculty at Johns
Hopkins. Baran, an electrical engineer by training, moved from
industry to RAND, a Federally Funded Research and Development
Center, and explored doctoral work at UCLA. Roberts worked at
Lincoln Lab before joining ARPA. Mills moved from university
(Maryland) to industry (Communication Satellite Corporation) and
back to university (Delaware) at the time of his fuzzball router
contributions. Andreessen went directly from undergraduate work
at Illinois to help form Netscape. Bloch became Director of NSF
after a long career at IBM.
Interinstitutional linkages are reflected in a different way in
membership on the myriad advisory committees to the Internet over
its history and in the coalitions that formed to provide network
services. Examples include Merit, Inc., a consortium of IBM,
MCI, and the University of Michigan, and the Internet Architecture
[formerly Activities] Board and its several task forces, such
as the Internet Engineering Task Force, on which government officials,
academics, and industry representatives serve. In many respects,
the Internet's existence exemplifies the extraordinary (relative
to most other industrialized nations) frequency and ease with
which scientists and engineers in the United States move back
and forth among government, industry, and university. It also
illustrates how a government agency's leadership can build on
this interinstitutional permeability to generate productive collaboration
at the national level.
Relationships between Fundamental Research and Technology
Development
The Internet appears, overall, to be primarily a problem-driven,
technology-based innovation that required little direct
input from fundamental research for its realization. The driving
forces, interestingly, were not profit incentives in the private
market, but public goods, first in the realm of national defense
and subsequently in the university and government research infrastructure,
as a means of fostering communication among computer scientists.
What we are calling the Internet's intrinsic technologies-network
design, packet switching, routers, protocols, browsers-were the
products of problem-driven research conducted in universities
and government contractor laboratories with government support.
One possible exception is the research conducted at the University
of Illinois's NCSA, which took place in an environment (according
to Andreessen) that enabled researchers to head off in directions
that looked "interesting" without seeking justification.
Nonetheless, the context was one of application, as suggested
by the Center's name.
Although the evolution of the Internet did not encounter technical
roadblocks that required fundamental research for their resolution
before further progress could be made, there is obvious, fundamental
research content in both the Internet's intrinsic and supporting
technologies. The electronic and physical infrastructures that
comprise the Internet clearly depend on information theory, solid
state physics, electro-optics, and other fields on which modern
communications technology is based and for which NSF has provided
substantial research support.
Property Rights
An obvious feature of the Internet is its "ownerlessness."
It is perhaps astonishing that an innovation that has proved
to be of such tremendous economic significance and that has spawned
numerous personal fortunes and substantial commercial profits
is based almost entirely on nonproprietary technology. Yet, as
we have seen, the key technical innovations were developed with
government support and, because of the vision of Vinton Cerf,
Robert Kahn, Steve Wolff, and other pioneers, decisions to use
nonproprietary technology were made whenever there was a choice.
Another unusual feature of the Internet is that most browser
and utility software, including Mosaic, Netscape, Fetch, Gopher,
and others, was usually made available free on the World Wide
Web. Mosaic was distributed free because of NSF's support of
NCSA; in the case of Netscape and most other browsers, profits
are realized not through purchase of the software by individual
users (to whom much of it is largely free) but through its selection
by commercial entities as the basis for construction and use of
their own Web sites. In contrast to many other types of innovations,
diffusion of the Internet's intrinsic technologies was enhanced
rather than inhibited by their public character. It was apparently
an advantage, from a technology diffusion point of view, that
the profitmaking aspects of the Internet were not realized until
most of its present features were already in place. By about
1990, the public-goods nature of the Internet began to be intermingled,
successfully, with commercial interests. It is beyond the scope
of this case to explore the extent to which this unusual evolution
is repeatable for other innovations. Doing so may also be premature,
in that the innovation is still evolving.
NSF Role
As we noted above, NSF's role (and the roles of other agencies)
can be separated into leadership and support categories. With
respect to leadership, it is well documented that NSF program
managers Dennis Jennings, Steve Wolff, and Jane Caviness, working
within the highly supportive environment provided-at least at
the level of top management-by Erich Bloch, took risks[75], developed
highly creative solutions to difficult problems (such as how to
incorporate commercial activity into NSFNET), and provided essential
services in coordinating among other federal agencies, academic
researchers, and industry. NSFNET's initiation and architecture
are attributable to Jennings and Wolff, and the transition to
commercial support to Wolff and Caviness. As Mandelbaum and Mandelbaum
observed, a different set of decisions by NSF "would have
led to a far different networking universe than the one we have
today." NSF was a leader among equals in various coordinating
committees, such as the Federal Networking Council, in which,
according to Robert Kahn, "NSF played the dominant role."
As the Charles Babbage Institute's report documents, the foundations
of the Internet were laid by ARPA in the Department of Defense.
But by the mid-1980s, primary financial support of the Internet
had been assumed by NSF. NSF's support of education and infrastructure,
although more subtle and difficult to identify, permeates the
history of many of the key contributors. Some argue that the
birth of the Internet occurred when two federal networks, ARPANET
and CSNET, were interconnected in 1983. NSF provided the planning
grant to Larry Landweber for the connection in 1980. Vinton Cerf
and Robert Kahn point to substantial NSF support for their own
personal education and doctoral support: NSF supported Kahn's
doctoral studies in electrical engineering under a fellowship;
his dissertation adviser at Princeton received partial research
support from NSF. Leonard Kleinrock and the "UCLA Mafia"
were supported almost entirely by ARPA; Gerald Estrin (Cerf's
Ph.D. adviser) obtained some support from NSF as well. During
the 1970s, Estrin advised Vinton Cerf, Steve Crocker, and, earlier,
Paul Baran. NSF provided about a third of Dave Mills' support
beginning in about 1982. The award to NCSA provided direct support
to Marc Andreessen, as well as the environment and resources that
enabled him to implement Mosaic as a browser for all computer
users, not just supercomputer researchers.
NSF also provided a substantial amount of the university-based
computing infrastructure that NSFNET joined together. Aspray
and Williams (1994) show that, between 1959 and 1971, NSF made
more than 400 awards for computing facilities to colleges and
universities under the computer center facilities program, totaling
more than $60 million.[76] By the time the program was terminated,
most U.S. academic institutions had established computing centers.
ARPA support for computer science research during this period
dwarfed NSF's, but it was concentrated at a small number of selected
computer science departments. NSF support of computing facilities,
networks, and research in computer science and engineering resumed
again in the 1980s, resulting in five supercomputer centers, CSNET
and NSFNET, partial support for regional networks, and substantial
support for research and other infrastructure elements. By the
late 1980s, NSF support for computer and information science and
engineering amounted to well over $100 million annually.[77]
REFERENCES
Aboba, Barnard. The Online Users Encyclopedia.
New York: Addison-Wesley, 1993.
Andreessen, Marc. Interview with LAN Times, Thom Stark
Home Page, http://www.dnai.com/~thomst/.
Aspray, William, and Williams, Bernard O. "Arming American
Scientists: NSF and the Provision of Scientific Computing Facilities
for Universities, 1950-1973," IEEE Annals of the History
of Computing, 16, 4 (1994): 60-74.
Cerf, Vinton G. http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/lazowska/cra/networks.html.
Cerf, Vinton. How the Internet Came to Be, as told
to Bernard Aboba, 1993.
Cerf, Vinton. Computer Networking: Global Infrastracture
for the 21st Century, 1995.
Charles Babbage Institute (CBI). An Interview with Robert
Kahn, OH 158, March 22, 1989.
Charles Babbage Institute (CBI). An Interview with Paul
Baran, March 5, 1990a.
Charles Babbage Institute (CBI). An Interview with Vinton
Cerf, OH 191, April 24, 1990b.
Comer, Douglas. The Computer Science Research Network CSNET:
A History and Status Report, Communications of the ACM,
26, 10 (1983): 747-753.
Data Communications (March 1988): 270.
Jennings, Dennis, Landweber, Lawrence, Fuchs, Ira, and Farber,
David. Computer Networking for Scientists, Science
23 (February 1986).
Kahin, Brian, ed. Building Information Infrastructure.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
Kahin, Brian. "Overview: Understanding the NREN," in
Kahin (1993).
Kahn, Robert. "The Role of Government in the Evolution of
the Internet," in National Academy of Engineering, Revolution
in the U.S. Information Infrastructure. Washington DC: National
Academy Press, 1995.
Kleinrock, Leonard. Issues in the Design of the NREN,
in Kahin (1993).
Krol, E., and Hoffman, E. Network Working Group Request for Comments:
RFC 1462, FYI on "What Is the Internet?" (May 1993).
Mandelbaum, Richard, and Mandelbaum, Paulette A. "The Strategic
Future of the Mid-Level Networks, in Kahin (1993).
Merit Network, Inc. NSFNET, Final Report 1987-1995.
National Academy of Engineering. Revolution in the U.S. Information
Infrastructure. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995.
National Research Council. Realizing the Information Future:
The Internet and Beyond. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1994.
National Science Foundation, FY 1988 Budget to the Congress.
National Science Foundation, Office of the Inspector General.
"Review of NSFNET" (March 23, 1993).
Norberg, Arthur, and O'Neill, Judy. A History of the Information
Processing Techniques Office of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency. Minneapolis, MN: The Charles Babbage Institute,
1992.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. High Performance
Computing and Networking for Science. Background Paper. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1989.
SRI INTERVIEWS
Paul Baran, RAND Corporation (retired)
Leonard Kleinrock, UCLA
Robert Kahn, Corporation for National Research Initiatives