Garg, S., Gentry, C., Halevi, S., & Raykova, M. (2014, 24-26 February). Two-round secure MPC from indistinguishability obfuscation. Paper presented at the Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC’14), San Diego, CA.
Abstract
One fundamental complexity measure of an MPC protocol is its {em round complexity}. Asharov et al. recently constructed the first three-round protocol for general MPC in the CRS model. Here, we show how to achieve this result with only two rounds. We obtain UC security with abort against static malicious adversaries, and fairness if there is an honest majority. Additionally the communication in our protocol is only proportional to the input and output size of the function being evaluated and independent of its circuit size. Our main tool is indistinguishability obfuscation, for which a candidate construction was recently proposed by Garg et al.
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